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Shiv Nadar University

The focus of the present paper is on the investigation of the deformation and forces of an isolated steel beam column sub-frame exposed to localized fire. The investigated frame is modelled using finite element software ABAQUS considering three dimensional solid elements. A sequentially coupled thermo-mechanical analysis, where the derived temperature distribution obtained from the heat transfer analysis used as an input for the mechanical analysis, is carried out. The input heat flux which acts as Neumann boundary condition for the heat transfer analysis is considered from widely recognized handbook of ‘Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SPFE)’ of fire. Elasto-plastic material model is used for steel where the temperature dependent material properties are followed according to the Eurocode 3. Different cases were investigated based on the location of the localized fire source in the floor below the exposed beam. It was observed that for asymmetrical location of the fire source beneath the beam, the rotation for the far end connection to the fire source was always higher than the near end. © 2022 ISEC Press.

World University root node

Economics

(SoHSS) School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Proceedings of International Structural Engineering and Construction

RESPONSE OF STEEL FRAME ASSEMBLY UNDER LOCALIZED FIRE EFFECT

In this paper, we study the role of a tax-funded public security system in superior technology adoption by strategic agents and consequent welfare implications of improvement in property security in an environment where rights to private property are completely insecure. We show that if property insecurity leads to technological backwardness (through strategic non-adoption of costlessly available superior technologies), a tax-funded public security that thwarts appropriation (much like a security-guard) can successfully support superior technology adoption by strategic agents in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The superior technology equilibrium might even be welfare improving over the technological backwardness equilibrium if the available technology spectrum is sufficiently wide. We then study—within the confines of superior technology adoption—whether more secure property is always welfare improving for everyone. We find that better property security—although growth-enhancing—might not be welfare improving for all. Indeed, it is possible that the poor are made worse-off as a consequence of reallocation of resources in response to enhanced property security and not because public authorities are corruptible. In such a situation, we design a budget-balanced tax-linked-transfer scheme where the poor is given a tax-relief at the expense of an additional tax burden on the rich agent. We show that for a below thirtypercent tax relief to the poor, a Pareto-improving movement towards property security can be achieved. © 2021, Editorial Office, Indian Economic Review.

Indian Economic Review

Public security, technology adoption and welfare implications in an insecure property rights environment

We analyze dynamic private provision of a discrete public good by heterogeneous agents, who differ in terms of their levels of impatience, in a differential game framework. In contrast to the strategic complementarity result for homogeneous individuals, we show that an asymmetric completion Markov perfect equilibrium exists, where the individual contributions and the strategic behaviors depend crucially on an impatience differential: the difference in rates of time preference across groups of individuals. When this differential is insignificant, contributions of both types of individuals are strategic complements. On the other hand, when this impatience differential exceeds a threshold, the contributions of impatient individuals become strategic substitutes, whereas the contributions of patient individuals remain strategic complements. We show that group size has an interesting role to play in the strategic behavior: increasing the number of patient individuals aggravates the incentives to free-ride by the impatient agents. We also derive a condition under which all the socially beneficial projects get completed in the equilibrium. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.