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Shiv Nadar University

In this paper, we show that firms might get an additional strategic benefit from using marginal-cost-reducing investments in conjunction with strategic delegation. While both these instruments allow firms to "aggressively"participate in product market competition, we show that they act as substitutes or complements depending on whether they are chosen simultaneously or sequentially. Given that the use of such instruments is inseparably linked with a Prisoner's Dilemma kind of situation, our analysis shows a way to mitigate at least to some extent such effects, through their simultaneous use. We find that the unique Nash equilibrium of the game with commitment comprises both players choosing the instruments simultaneously. In case the instruments are chosen without commitment, an asymmetric equilibrium is shown to exist in addition to the simultaneous protocol, yielding unequal payoffs. © 2020 World Scientific Publishing Company.

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Economics

(SoHSS) School of Humanities and Social Sciences

International Game Theory Review

Investment Choice with Managerial Incentive Schemes

We show in this paper that the class of Lipschitz functions provides a suitable framework for the generalization of classical envelope theorems for a broad class of constrained programs relevant to economic models, in which nonconvexities play a key role, and where the primitives may not be continuously differentiable. We give sufficient conditions for the value function of a Lipschitz program to inherit the Lipschitz property and obtain bounds for its upper and lower directional Dini derivatives. With strengthened assumptions we derive sufficient conditions for the directional differentiability, Clarke regularity, and differentiability of the value function, thus obtaining a collection of generalized envelope theorems encompassing many existing results in the literature. Some of our findings are then applied to decision models with discrete choices, to dynamic programming with and without concavity, to the problem of existence and characterization of Markov equilibrium in dynamic economies with nonconvexities, and to show the existence of monotone controls in constrained lattice programming problems. © 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

Generalized Envelope Theorems: Applications to Dynamic Programming

Emerging market economy business cycles are typically characterized by high consumption and output volatility, strongly counter-cyclical current accounts, and counter-cyclical real interest rates. Evidence from the wider EME and less developed economy business cycle experience suggests however that real interest rates can also be pro-cyclical. We reconcile the pro-cyclicality of real interest rates with the above facts by embedding fiscal policy into a standard emerging market business cycle model. We show that fiscal policy makes real interest rates a-cyclical or pro-cyclical. We use the model to replicate some of the key features of the Indian business cycle. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.

Fulltext

Journal of Economic Asymmetries

Fiscal policy in an emerging market business cycle model

We develop a nonsmooth approach to envelope theorems applicable to a broad class of parameterized constrained nonlinear optimization problems that arise typically in economic applications with nonconvexities and/or nonsmooth objectives. Our methods emphasize the role of the Strict Mangasarian-Fromovitz Constraint Qualification (SMFCQ), and include envelope theorems for both the convex and nonconvex case, allow for noninterior solutions as well as equality and inequality constraints. We give new sufficient conditions for the value function to be directionally differentiable, as well as continuously differentiable. We apply our results to stochastic growth models with Markov shocks and constrained lattice programming problems. © 2015 Elsevier B.V.