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On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
Lahiri A.,
Published in Springer
Volume: 54
Issue: 4
Pages: 581 - 607
We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterize the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Further, we provide a simple description of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. The key feature of our characterization results brings out the role played by indifferent agents. © 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
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