This paper characterizes status quo rules in the binary social choice environment. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. We show that status quo rules are the only rules that satisfy ontoness, strategy-proofness and a solidarity property. The solidarity property that we consider, positively correlates the welfare of a voter to rest of the voters in case of her improvement. It is independent from the usual solidarity axiom of welfare dominance under preference replacement used in the literature. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.

Anup Pramanik

Economics

(SoHSS) School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Bandhu S.

Lahiri A.

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Shiv Nadar University

Economics Letters

We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy-proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterize the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of efficiency is not desirable always. Further, we provide a simple description of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. The key feature of our characterization results brings out the role played by indifferent agents. © 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

Fulltext

Social Choice and Welfare

On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives

Games and Economic Behavior

Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: A tale of two rules

Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo

Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice

Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model